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1 Introduction
A widely held tenet among environmental economists and policy makers alike is that the
development of new, cleaner technologies decreases the cost of pollution reductions. The
natural consequence of this view is that policy-induced technical change lowers the costs of
complying with environmental regulations and facilitates the implementation of ambitious
environmental policies. This deep-rooted trust in the salvic power of technology, how-
ever, may appear unjustied in light of the historical record showing that over the course
of the last two centuries a number of major technological developments ushered dramatic
improvements in energy eciency, while at the same time fostering large increases in en-
ergy use and polluting emissions.1 In other words, the process of technological change has
in the past often proven to be pollution-using, rather than pollution-saving.
To explain this apparent paradox, it is useful to distinguish between the general notion that
the adoption of new technologies responds to prot incentives, and the more specic notion
whereby technological change responds to policies in so far as they aect prots - a dis-
tinction between endogenous innovation and policy-induced technical change. Within an
endogenous innovation framework, rms implement innovations they expect to increase
their prots, and the pollution-saving or pollution-using nature of the technology is imma-
terial. When environmental policy makes pollution more expensive, however, it also makes
pollution-saving innovations relatively more protable than pollution-using ones. For this
reason in the dominant view (environmental) policy-induced technical change (ITC) is good
for the environment: the policy aligns the innovative rm’s prot motives with the policy-
maker’s environmental goals and ITC makes the policy more eective and less costly.
In this paper we show that this view may break down in the presence of externalities,
distortions, or general equilibrium eects. We emphasize two main avenues behind this
result. On the one hand, while environmental policy would become cheaper if rms adopted
pollution-saving technology, they may actually nd it optimal to respond to changes in
policy by instead adopting pollution-using technology if the latter turns out to be more
protable from their point of view. This may happen in a second-best world in which price
distortions introduce a wedge between the rms’ prot incentives and society’s policy aims.
On the other hand, even if rms focus on pollution-saving innovations, their response may
impose a large enough cost to society to end up crowding out valuable innovations.2 The
literature has so far widely neglected these possibilities, either by assuming that innovation
can only be pollution-saving or by abstracting from second-best and general equilibrium
issues.
The key mechanism by which ITC may increase the cost of environmental policy is thus
by decoupling the private returns to investment in clean technologies from their social re-
turns. To illustrate this mechanism, it is enough to consider the role of a simple production
externality from pollution. As pollution falls, rms’ production and prots benet, but the
rms themselves do not recognize this external eect when making decisions on their emis-
1Examples of such technologies are steam powered pumps and looms in the nineteenth century, internal
combustion engines at the turn of the twentieth century, petrochemical plastics and fertilizers after World
War II, jet planes for intercontinental ights in the 1960’s, and personal computer and other information and
communication technologies from the 1980’s.
2This mechanism is similar to the scale eect emphasized in Gans (2012).
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sion levels and technologies. In the presence of such an externality, rms might protably
respond to the bigger market size by increasing their production and emissions, and by
investing in polluting-using capital. To make matters worse, investment incentives may
also be distorted by suboptimal policies, such as subsidies to polluting inputs that trigger
pollution-using investment and innovation.
Our results challenge the conventional wisdom and show that ITC may raise the opportu-
nity cost of pollution abatement, reduce the willingness to pay for environmental quality,
or both. The presence of ITC may thus make environmental policy targets more costly
to achieve, or lead to situations where policies become optimally less ambitious, implying
lower pollution reductions.3 These results are at odds with most of the existing literature,
which instead nds that ignoring ITC leads to overestimating the costs of environmental
policy.4,5
In this paper, we use a stylized, static framework that lets us transparently identify the driv-
ing forces behind our results. These results are driven by a combination of elements that
are empirically relevant but often neglected in other analyses of induced technical change.
In particular, our conclusions emerge in a second-best world in which environmental qual-
ity aects productivity and thus interacts with investment decisions. We also nd that
they are more likely to arise when innovations lead to a signicant increase in the demand
for physical capital. Such complementarity between new technology and physical capital
matches historical patterns of innovation and investment, with expansions in sectors where
new products and improved technologies are introduced, and with displacements of older
technologies by newer, more capital-intensive ones.6
In what follows, we show how two simple modications of the standard set-up, introduced
3Note that, in the model presented below, environmental policy is both desirable, in the sense that it leads
to welfare improvements, and eective, in the sense that it achieves pollution reductions. Our claim that ITC
reduces the eectiveness or increases the cost of environmental policy refers to the comparison between an
hypothetical world where technology is exogenously given, and the more realistic world in which technology
and investment react to changes in the relative prices of production factors.
4In the context of climate change, the latest IPCC report discusses climate policy models with ITC and
concludes that “These models demonstrate that ignoring induced innovation overstates the costs of climate con-
trol” (IPCC, 2014, p.257). Similar positions have been expressed in the well-known Stern Review (Stern, 2006)
and by Goulder (2004). Modelling eorts that support this view are discussed at length in the context of
the Innovation Modelling Comparison Project by Edenhofer et al. (2006). An extreme representation of this
paradigm is oered by Acemoglu et al. (2012), who show that environmental policy only needs to be tempo-
rary to prevent environmental collapse by redirecting technological change.
5As discussed later in the paper, a number of authors have previously argued that technical change might
lead to an increases in the marginal cost of pollution abatement (Amir et al., 2008; Baker et al., 2008; Bauman
et al., 2008; Perino and Requate, 2012; Brechet and Meunier, 2014). We dier from these contribution in that
their focus is on partial equilibrium models of technology adoption, whereas we provide a general equilibrium
view of induced innovation in the presence of additional distortions. Gans (2012) nds that environmental
policy may reduce innovation through a scale eect. Our results in the present paper generalize his ndings
since, rather than relying on specic functional forms, we derive our results in a general setting.
6Looking back to the list of innovations in footnote 1, one might think of the development of petrochem-
istry and plastics – whose versatility in production lead to a myriad novel uses – as well as jet engines used
for transatlantic ights as examples of new products introduced with increased demand for capital as a result.
The other technologies in that list t better among the capital-intensive innovations. Large steam-powered
iron pumps and mills replaced hand-operated wooden ones during the industrial revolution, automobiles
replaced horses and carriages, etc.
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to capture empirically relevant features of environmental policy, have profound implica-
tions for policy outcomes. First, while we assume that the direct (ceteris-paribus) eect of
new technology is to reduce pollution, our modelling reveals that the use of such technol-
ogy may impact the environment adversely through indirect eects. In the rst part of our
paper we show that the general-equilibrium eect of the new technology can actually be
either in favor or against the environment, depending on the degree to which new technol-
ogy fosters demand for physical capital. Moreover, we demonstrate that rms faced with
more stringent environmental regulation might decide to either increase or decrease their
investment in new technology. Thus, more stringent environmental regulation does not
necessarily lead to more technology creation, and might, instead, crowd-out such invest-
ment. We nd, for example, that for both price and quantity instruments a tightening of the
environmental regulation might either crowd-in brown technology or crowd it out, imply-
ing in each case very dierent eects on the marginal cost of pollution abatement. By con-
trast, most existing contributions studying the interaction between environmental policy
and induced innovation assume implicitly or explicitly that investment in new technolo-
gies necessarily lowers the marginal cost of reducing emissions. Given such assumption,
it is not surprising that environmental policy that increases investment lowers abatement
costs, inducing additional emissions reductions (Goulder and Mathai, 2000; Nordhaus, 2002;
Parry et al., 2003; Popp, 2004; Sue Wing, 2006; Gerlagh, 2007).
The second aspect in which our modelling choices dier from most other contributions in
the literature is our explicit recognition that environmental policy is not conducted in a
void, but it rather happens in the presence of a number of other externalities, notably ex-
ternalities due to market failures in innovation (Jae et al., 2003). Realistically, our model
captures the idea that existing policies may fail to correctly internalize the full social bene-
ts from innovation (Griliches, 1992), at the same time that they provide excessive support
to investments that complement polluting inputs such as coal or oil (Davis, 2014; Coady
et al., 2015). This deviation from the rst-best has important implications for the welfare
consequences of environmental policy. In a context where (exogenous) environmental pol-
icy is arbitrarily tightened from an initial suboptimal level, for example, we show that it
is possible for welfare to improve less under ITC than under exogenous technology. In
an endogenous policy context, where the stringency of regulation depends on preferences,
instead, the presence of additional distortions introduces the possibility that following an
increase in the degree of ‘greenness’ of preferences, ITC may induce the regulator to be-
come less ambitious in setting environmental targets. This is because in this context the
desired reductions in pollution come at the cost of relatively larger falls in consumption,
and/or because the regulator might optimally decide to trade-o smaller welfare gains in
terms of pollution reductions against potential large welfare costs along other dimensions.
The main aim of this paper is to present a tractable model that generalizes existing ap-
proaches and allows us to derive novel results. Contrary to the dominant view, we show
that the induced change in technology driven by environmental policy may (partially) undo
the regulator’s eorts. We also show that, given the presence of additional externalities, ITC
may end up reducing the optimal stringency of environmental policy. Transparently, these
‘unconventional’ results arise under completely standard assumptions and are not just an
intellectual curiosum.
The policy implications of our analysis are striking. That technology facilitates the working
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of environmental policy measures should not be taken for granted, as environmental policy
might instead end up being less eective or more expensive, depending on how technology
actually responds. Crucially, ambitious environmental policy eorts that rely on signi-
cant shifts in the existing technological paradigm need to be complemented by carefully
designed measures to ensure that the incentives that emerge for investors are aligned with
those of the social planner, in order to avoid environmental policy taking on an unexpected,
paler shade of green.
In the rest of the paper, we build our investigation in steps. After a description of the model
(Section 2) and the rst-best outcome (Section 3), our analysis begins with an investiga-
tion of ITC within a framework with exogenous policy in Section 4. In Section 5, we shift
our attention to a second-best environmental policy set-up. Finally, Section 6 discusses
the relationship between our results and the existing literature, elaborates on some policy
implications, and concludes.
2 The model: rms, policy and consumers
In our economy, a continuum of unit mass of identical rms produce the nal good, Y ,
using technology, H , physical capital, K , and pollution, P . Output is strictly increasing in
all (private) inputs. Output also increases with environmental quality, N , that enhances the
productivity of all inputs, i.e. it increases total factor productivity (TFP).7 Throughout the
paper we interpret H as an intangible input – technology for short – used in production.
It can be thought of as ideas, blueprints or patents purposefully developed via conscious
eorts in the economy. It follows that K should be thought of as all the tangible inputs –
i.e. physical capital – needed to embody these ideas and turn them into useful innovations
(e.g. Solow, 1960; Intriligator, 1965). Environmental quality, N , is a ‘public input’ in the
sense that aggregate pollution reduces environmental quality, but each individual rm has a
negligible impact on the aggregate. Hence, the productivity eect of a cleaner environment
is an externality. Thus, each rm s ∈ [0, 1] produces nal output according to the following
production function,8
Y (s ) = y (K (s ),H (s ), P (s ),N ), (1)
where environmental quality is normalized as the negative of aggregate pollution:
N = −
∫ 1
0
P (s )ds . (2)
We assume that the marginal productivity of all inputs is strictly positive and decreasing, as
customary. Given our assumption above that there exists a positive production externality
7The aggregate nature of our model implies a rather comprehensive understanding of what constitutes
pollution in this context. In fact, anything that reduces environmental quality, N , represents pollution in our
model, while environmental quality is anything that either boosts TFP or that provides utility to consumers.
In this respect, P is a broad indicator of the environmental and ecological footprint of human productive
activities and should be thought of as encompassing polluting emissions and land use, as well as habitat and
biodiversity loss, ecosystem services loss, and much more.
8Throughout the paper, we use capital letters to indicate variables and lower case ones denote functions.
Moreover, we use subscripts to indicate partial derivatives, so that ∂z (X ,Y )/∂X = zX , ∂2z (X ,Y ))/∂X∂Y =
zXY .
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from environmental quality, we letyKN > 0,yHN > 0, andyPN > 0. The empirical literature
suggests that polluting inputs and capital are complements,9 which leads us to assume
yKP > 0.
Several assumptions are possible in principle regarding the sign and relative magnitude of
yHK andyHP . In the interest of a concise presentation, in the main text we derive our results
for the most interesting cases and address alternative situations in footnotes, as relevant.10
The rst assumption we make in the main text is that technology is a gross substitute for
pollution, all else equal. This assumption ensures that technology reduces the demand for
polluting inputs, ceteris paribus:11
Assumption 1. Technology and pollution are gross substitutes, yPH < 0.
In the introduction, we argued that in the past a number of key new technologies in-
creased demand for capital. Indeed, it seems undisputable that steam powered pumps and
looms, internal combustion engines, plastics and fertilizers, jet planes and personal com-
puter were all so successful in increasing the productivity of physical capital, that demand
for pollution-intensive capital boomed. Thus, while in general not ruling out other possi-
bilities, we are naturally led by this historical evidence to see H and K as complements in
this context. We thus have our second assumption:
Assumption 2. Technology and physical capital are gross complements, yHK > 0.
The third restriction we impose in the main text ensures that capital becomes more produc-
tive if rms are allowed to pollute more, even taking into account the negative externality
to production due to environmental quality, i.e.
Assumption 3. yKP > yKN .
Each rm can acquire technology and physical capital through costly investment. A higher
level of either stock requires an increasingly larger amount of investment, I (s ) and J (s ), re-
spectively. In the spirit of Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986), we assume that for both types of
investment aggregate level aects the cost of investment for the individual rm in the form
of knowledge spillovers. Since the rm’s impact on aggregate investment is negligible, the
eect of investment on costs through such spillovers constitutes an externality. Formally,
the cost incurred by rm s to acquire more technology is
I (s ) = i (H (s ),H ), (3)
9That capital intensity positively correlates with pollution intensity is a commonly cited and used em-
pirical regularity, e.g. Antweiler et al. (2001), Cole and Elliott (2003).
10In the interest of clarity, it should be noted here that none of Assumptions 1, 2, or 3 is indispensable for
our results, as is shown in footnotes 24 and 25.
11This will become clearer below, see Lemma 3. Recall that new technologies make it possible to produce
the same with less pollution as both yH and yP are positive. Whether new technologies make it attractive to
reduce pollution, all else equal, depends on the sign of yHP . If we assumed yPH > 0, innovation would trigger
demand for polluting inputs. This is not unrealistic in certain contexts, e.g. improvements in oil drilling
techniques, and one that would make it even more likely that ITC increased the cost of environmental policy
- one of the central results of this paper. In what follows, we maintain Assumption 1 to be on the conservative
side, and to allow for the possibility of ‘green innovations.’
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where H is aggregate technology, i.e.
H =
∫ 1
0
H (s )ds; (4)
the corresponding function for physical capital is
J (s ) = j (K (s ),K ), (5)
where K is the aggregate level of physical capital:
K =
∫ 1
0
K (s )ds . (6)
Our monotonicity and convexity assumptions above imply that iH > 0 and iHH > 0, as
well as iK > 0 and iKK > 0. As regards knowledge spillovers, two alternative situations are
possible in principle. First, the learning-by-doing case, where aggregate investment reduces
both marginal and total investment cost and iH < 0 and iHH < 0, for example. Second, the
congestion case, where the opposite happens, e.g. due to patent races or shing-out (cf.
Jones, 1995). In this case iH > 0 and iHH > 0. In the interest of brevity, in the rest of the
paper we only focus on the learning-by-doing case:12
Assumption 4. iH < 0, iHH < 0, and iHH + iHH < 0; similarly, jK < 0, jKK < 0, and
jKK + jKK < 0.
To ensure a well dened equilibrium, we additionally need to rule out cases where the
external eects are too strong, to this end we assume the following:13
Assumption 5. iHH + iHH − yHH − yHKyKHjKK+jKK−yKK > 0.
Each rm chooses the level of capital, technology, and pollution to maximize its prots,
taking into account the regulations it faces. Regulation consist of a price on pollution equal
to τ – which, depending on the policy instrument, can be either an explicit pollution tax,
or the price of pollution permits under a cap and trade system14 – and subsidies equal to σ
12The last assumption in each set of inequalities simply assures that the gains from experience do not
vanish with the size of the economy. These assumptions are satised by common specications like the
Cobb-Douglas, where i (H ,H ) ∝ HηHψ with ψ < 0 < η +ψ − 1, for example, or the quadratic, in which case
i (H ,H ) ∝ (H +ψH )2 with −1 < ψ < 0.
13The positiveness of the expression in Assumption 5 is required for the stability of the symmetric Nash
equilibrium. If the expression were negative, which would arise for suciently strong learning by doing
eects (iHH suciently negative), an arbitrary small increase in investment by some rms (akin to a “tremble”
in game theoretical parlance) would trigger sucient spillovers to other rms for them to increase investment
as well, without ever returning to the original symmetric equilibrium. Full details of the formal argument are
available from the authors upon request.
14If we let P (s ) be the permits allocated to rm s and P =
∫ 1
0 P (s )ds the total amount of permits in the
market, the assumption that rms are identical implies that, in equilibrium, P (s ) = P = P , for each s . This has
the further implication that dP = dP : any tightening of the aggregate cap translates into an identical reduction
in emissions for each individual rm. For economy of exposition, from now on we refer to a tightening of the
cap directly as a reduction in P , rather than in P¯ .
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and θ for each unit of technology or physical capital it invests in, respectively.15 We assume
that further distortions are avoided by imposing that any revenue from taxation or from
the auctioning of permits is lump-sum rebated to households.
The prots of rm s are given by:16
Π(s ) = y (K (s ),H (s ), P (s ),N ) − i (H (s ),H ) − j (K (s ),K ) + σH (s ) + θK (s ) − τP (s ), (7)
where we normalize the price of the nal good to 1, so that y (·) denotes revenue.
From our assumption that all rms are identical, it follows that they will be symmetric
in equilibrium, so that we can drop the rm indicator in what follows. In the symmetric
equilibrium, environmental quality and aggregate investment in the two types of capital –
see (2), (4), and (6) – take the following simple forms:
N = −P , H = H , and K = K (8)
Our representative consumer derives utility from her consumption of the nal good, and
from her enjoyment of the natural environment. Formally, we write
U = u (C,N ;ϕ), (9)
where C is consumption, i.e. the amount of aggregate output net of investment costs,
C = Y − I − J . (10)
We conform to standard assumptions by letting uz > 0, uzz < 0, for each input z = C,N ,
and uCN = uNC ≥ 0. We use ϕ in the utility function to parameterize the relative prefer-
ence for environmental quality. An increase in ϕ raises the marginal willingness to pay for
environmental quality,
ω (C,N ;ϕ) ≡ uN (C,N ;ϕ)
uC (C,N ;ϕ)
, (11)
and thus represents a greening of preferences.17
15We model support to investment as subsidies per unit of capital, be it technology, H , or physical capital,
K . Alternatively, one could consider a subsidy per unit of investment cost, which would complicate the
analytical expressions without changing the results. Notice, moreover, that in principle σ and θ might well
need to correct for a congestion externality (i.e. a negative knowledge spillover), in which case they would
become negative subsidies, i.e. taxes.
16Notice that we have a market with homogenous output and price taking rms. In equilibrium, positive
prots accrue due to an implicit xed factor, e.g. managerial talent. Alternatively, we could have assumed
monopolistic competition with prots due to product dierentiation. This is the usual modelling practice
in the endogenous growth literature. As long as rms are symmetric, no substantial changes would arise
in the conclusions, although the results would be complicated by the additional externality stemming from
monopolistic price setting.
17We assume that ωC > 0, ωN < 0. Moreover, we normalizing ωϕ to 1 such that we can conveniently
express the preference shift mentioned in the main text as dϕ = dω |dC=dN=0 > 0.
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3 Solving the model: the rst-best
In the rst-best equilibrium, the social planner chooses levels of H , K , and P to maximize
the representative agent’s utility subject to the constraints represented by the available
technology (1) and by the natural environment (2). At the optimum, the three types of
externalities discussed above are all correctly internalized.
The optimal level of investment in technology, H , is obtained when the marginal produc-
tivity of any addition to the stock is exactly oset by the increase in the cost of investment,
net of the cost savings due to learning-by-doing, i.e.
yH = iH + iH . (12)
Similarly, for physical capital, K , we have:
yK = jK + jK . (13)
Finally, the optimal level of pollution emerges when, at the margin, any increase in output
from the emission of a further unit of pollution is just compensated by the productivity
losses and the decrease in utility arising from the additional deterioration of environmental
quality. Formally,
yP = yN + ω . (14)
In a regulated market equilibrium the representative rm chooses physical capital, technol-
ogy and pollution to maximize its prots, see (7). The equilibrium satises the following
rst-order conditions,
yH = iH − σ , (15)
yK = jK − θ , (16)
yP = τ , (17)
where σ , θ and τ are the subsidies to the dierent types of investment and the mandated
price of pollution discussed in section 2.
From (12)–(14), it is immediate to see that the rst-best outcome discussed above can be de-
centralized as a Nash equilibrium provided that the investment subsidies and the Pigouvian
tax are given by:
σ ∗ ≡ −iH , (18)
θ ∗ ≡ −jK , (19)
τ ∗ ≡ yN + ω . (20)
While the rst-best policy that simultaneously satises (18)-(20) is a useful benchmark for
our analysis, it is hardly ubiquitous. Indeed, in reality much of the environmental policy
debate refers to the introduction or the strengthening of pollution reducing measures, as
well as the phasing out of ill-designed subsidies. For this reason, from now on we assume
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that the level of the pollution tax (or, equivalently, of the cap) is exogenously xed at some
arbitrary level lower (higher, respectively) than the one in (20). We further assume that
technology is under-provided at the initial equilibrium, whereas physical capital is over-
provided. In short, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 6. The policy instruments in initial equilibrium satisfy τ < τ ∗, σ < σ ∗, and
θ > θ ∗.
This assumption realistically implies that there are reasons to advocate a tighter environ-
mental policy, that in the market equilibrium rms underinvest in technology relative to
the social optimum, and that subsidies exist that make polluting inputs ‘too cheap’ in the
market equilibrium.
In this context, we will focus on studying the impact of a marginal tightening of environ-
mental policy. Such a policy intervention is formally given by either an increase in the tax
rate dτ > 0, or by a reduction of the cap, i.e. dP < 0. In later sections, as our focus shifts to
endogenous policy, we allow the consumers’ willingness to pay for environmental quality
to determine the environmental tax (or cap). In such situations, our thought experiment
becomes one whereby preferences become greener – i.e. we study what happens when the
marginal willingness to pay for environmental quality increases – and we investigate an
increase in ϕ (see the discussion in Section 2, and footnote 17).
It is worth emphasizing at this stage that in what follows our aim is to gauge the impact of
ITC. To isolate the eect of technical change, we then compare outcomes under exogenous
technology – i.e. situations where changes in policy do not aect the level of H – and out-
comes in which H is, instead, allowed to endogenously adjust to changes in policy – i.e. the
ITC case. In the interest of clarity, it is useful to write the relevant equilibrium relationships
as functions of the environmental variable, P , and the key endogenous variable of interest,
H . Using the equilibrium denitions of N , H , and K in (8), and substituting them into (16),
we see immediately that the equilibrium level of physical capital can be written in terms of
P and H only, as:18
yK (K ,H , P ,−P ) − jK (K ,K ) + θ = 0⇒ K = k˜ (H , P ). (21)
Using this expression and substituting the equilibrium values ofN andH into the rst-order
conditions (15) and (17), we can fully characterize each rm’s choices in the symmetric Nash
equilibrium purely in terms of H and P as follows:
yH (k˜ (H , P ),H , P ,−P ) − iH (H ,H ) + σ︸                                           ︷︷                                           ︸
r˜ (H , P )
= 0, (22)
yP (k˜ (H , P ),H , P ,−P )︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
m˜(H , P )
= τ . (23)
In the expressions above, r˜ is the (excess) marginal return to investment in H , whereas m˜
is the rm’s marginal cost of pollution abatement (MAC), dened as the loss in output due
to a marginal reduction in pollution, taking as given all the other inputs to production.
18Throughout the paper we will add a tilde “∼” on a function symbol to highlight the fact that the variable
of interest depends, in a symmetric equilibrium, on P and H only.
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4 Induced technical change and exogenous environmen-
tal policy
We now begin our analysis of the role of ITC for the cost of environmental policy, starting
with the workhorse model of environmental economics, i.e. a set-up with exogenous policy.
Within this framework, we analyze the impact of a marginal tightening of environmental
policy with and without induced technological change. As explained above, our aim is to
contrast the exogenous technology equilibrium with the ITC one.
4.1 A marginal tightening of environmental policy
We start from equation (23), which describes the equilibrium relationship between the level
of pollution and its price, for a given level of technology. Totally dierentiating this equa-
tion, and rearranging terms, we get the following expression:19,20
dτ
dP = m˜P + m˜H
dH
dP︸ ︷︷ ︸
ITC
< 0. (24)
This equation separates changes in the marginal cost of abatement that occur as pollution
changes, i.e. movements along the MAC curve, from changes arising as a consequence of
changes in technology, i.e. shifts of the MAC curve itself. As indicated, the second term thus
captures the eect of induced technical change. This component is traditionally assumed
to be negative in the literature, so that the MAC curve shifts down as new technology is
adopted.21 This, however, turns out not to be the case in our framework where the reverse
shift emerges quite naturally. Before discussing this point further, however, we need to take
a closer look at the impact of ITC on the MAC.
The ITC term is itself composed of two parts, m˜H , which gauges the impact of changes in
technology on the marginal cost of pollution abatement, and dH/dP , which instead captures
the impact of changes in pollution on the stock of technology. To make some inroads into
understanding the rst of the two, we partially dierentiate (23) with respect to H and use
(21) to get:
m˜H = yPH + yPK
(
yKH
jKK + jKK − yKK
)
︸                  ︷︷                  ︸
k˜H
. (25)
The rst term at the right-hand side of this expression informs us that, given our assump-
tion that pollution and technology are gross substitutes, the direct eect of an increase in
the technology stock is to reduce the marginal cost of pollution reductions. The second
19Note that either the price or the quantity of pollution can be exogenously given in this context, depending
on whether we assume a regulator using a tax or a cap & trade system.
20The negativity of the expression below is directly implied by the necessary second-order conditions for
the prot maximization problem faced by rms.
21This case is captured in both panels of Figure 1 below by the dashed lines marked MACS . Well know
references in the literature that make this assumption include Milliman and Prince (1989), Goulder and Mathai
(2000), Requate and Unold (2003), Jae et al. (2003), Goulder (2004).
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term, however, highlights an additional channel through which changes in technology af-
fect the cost of pollution reduction. Since m˜ is also a function of K , the MAC is aected by
changes in the physical capital stock that occur as a consequence of changes in technology
(k˜H ). Equation (25) informs us that these induced changes inK may oset, and even reverse,
the direct eect of H on the MAC. This possibility arises whenever the degree of comple-
mentary between technology and physical capital is suciently large. We characterize a
situation where the MAC curve shifts upwards following an increase in technology invest-
ment as a case of brown technology. When the MAC curve shifts downwards as technology
improves, instead, we talk of technology being green. This latter case arises when the two
types of investment are not suciently complementary for the sign of m˜H to be positive.22
Formally, we have:
Lemma 1. In the model discussed above, technology is brown whenever
m˜H > 0 ⇔ yHK > −yPH
yPK
(jKK + jKK − yKK ),
and green otherwise.
Proof. Using (25), simply solve m˜H > 0 in terms of yHK to get the expression above. 
So far we have shown that, under perfectly plausible assumptions, the MAC may increase
rather than decrease, when technology is allowed to adjust. This result, which goes against
the assumptions commonly made in the literature, is not novel in the sense that others have
made the case for an increasing MAC (e.g. Amir et al., 2008; Baker et al., 2008; Bauman
et al., 2008; Heal and Tarui, 2010; Perino and Requate, 2012).23 Our modelling of brown
technology diers from these other contributions, however, in that in our framework new
technology is always green per se, since yPH < 0. Technological change turns brown due
to possible complementarity between technology and physical capital, which leads to the
environmental impacts – see the discussion leading up to Assumption 2.
The second term in the expression of the ITC eect in (24), dH/dP , gauges the impact of
changes in pollution on investment in technology. At the initial equilibrium, each rm
sets the level of investment in K and H according to the rst-order conditions (15) and (16).
Totally dierentiating these two equations, recalling (8), and using the resulting expressions
to solve for dH/dP , we nd:
dH
dP = ζ
[(
yHP − yHN
)
+
yHK
jKK + jKK − yKK
(yKP − yKN )
]
︸                                                         ︷︷                                                         ︸
r˜P
, (26)
22Obviously, when Assumption 2 is violated and technology and physical capital are substitutes rather
than complements, the MAC can only decrease with additional technology creation, and technology is always
green. When (only) Assumption 1 is violated, technology is always brown. When both Assumptions 1 and 2
are violated, again technology can be either brown or green.
23All the papers cited show that MAC curves for old and new technologies may actually cross, implying
that the same innovation may be either green or brown, depending on the range of abatement, which clearly
depends on the policy stringency. This is particularly relevant when, as in Perino and Requate (2012) for
example, the evaluation of the eect of environmental policy is performed against a ‘no-policy’ counterfactual.
In the present paper, however, we only deal with marginal changes in policy stringency, so we disregard this
aspect and classify technologies as either (locally) green or brown.
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where we let ζ ≡
[
(iHH + iHH − yHH ) − yHK yKHjKK+jKK−yKK
]−1
≥ 0, see Assumption 5. In this ex-
pression, r˜P is the change in the rate of return to investment in technology brought about
by a reduction in pollution. The rst term in the square bracket in (26) illustrates that
the decision to invest in technology is driven by the increased demand for H linked to
the decrease in pollution and the associated improvement in environmental quality. Intu-
itively, more stringent environmental policy crowds in additional investment in technology,
its substitute factor. This is not the whole story, however, as investment in technology is
also aected by changes in the stock of physical capital – the second part of the bracket in
(26). Under Assumption 3, investment in physical capital is reduced along with any reduc-
tion in pollution. Since capital and technology are complements, technology accumulation
is reduced via this channel. Provided that the complementarity between K and H is su-
ciently strong, environmental policy ends up crowding out investment in technology, which
runs counter to traditional tenets. The following lemma formalizes this discussion.24
Lemma 2. Amarginal tightening of environmental policy crowds out investment in technol-
ogy whenever
r˜P > 0 ⇔ yHK > −yHP − yHN
yKP − yKN
(
jKK + jKK − yKK
)
> 0.
Proof. Crowding out as a consequence of environmental policy requires dH/dP > 0, the statement
of the Lemma follows immediately from using (26) and recalling Assumption 3. 
In our discussion so far we have explained how, in the context of a marginal tightening of
exogenous environmental policy, the overall eect of ITC depends on the colour of tech-
nology, i.e. whether technology is green or brown, and on whether environmental policy
crowds technology in or out. From (24), it is clear that whenever the ITC term is posi-
tive, technological change proves pollution-saving, in the sense that – consistently with
the dominant view – it reduces the marginal cost of pollution abatement. Interestingly,
however, the possibility that technical change be pollution-using, i.e. that it might lead to
an increase in the marginal abatement cost – a situation ruled out by most of the literature
– is perfectly possible in our framework.25
Lemma 3. Induced Technical Change is pollution-using whenever
r˜Pm˜H < 0.
This can only happen when brown technology is crowded in, which requires,
−yHP
yKP
(
jKK + jKK − yKK
)
< yHK < −yHP − yHN
yKP − yKN
(
jKK + jKK − yKK
)
.
24Lemma 2 holds for Assumptions 1-3. The possibility of crowing out also obtains when technology and
physical capital are substitutes (i.e. when Assumption 2 is reversed). The condition under which crowding
out arises becomes: yHK (yKP − yKN ) > −(yHP − yHN ) (jKK + jKK − yKK ). With yHK < 0, crowding out
requires yKP < yKN , i.e. the productive externality associated with environmental quality be strong enough
to reverse the sign in Assumption 3.
25When technology and physical capital are substitutes rather than complements (i.e. when Assumption 2
is reversed), the possibility emerges that pollution-using technical change might result from the crowding out
of green technology. Just like the case discussed in footnote 24 above, however, this result only obtains when
the productive externality associated with environmental quality is suciently strong, i.e. when yKP < yKN
(and Assumption 3 is reversed).
Shades of Green - Environmental Policy and ITC 14
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Lemma 1 and 2. 
The lemma highlights the potentially surprising conclusion that environmental policy may
lead rms to make investment decisions that imply an increase in pollution. In fact, this
outcome is less surprising when one considers that as the price of pollution increases, it
depresses the returns to pollution-using technologies and at the same time, it boosts them
through the indirect eect of the improved environmental quality. Since the productivity
eect of environmental quality is an externality – rms do not internalize the eect of their
decisions on environmental quality and productivity – it may still be individually rational
for rms to respond to high pollution prices (or better to the combination of higher prices
and higher productivity) by investing in ways that, in equilibrium, increases pollution.
The fact that the marginal cost of pollution abatement might increase under induced tech-
nical change has profound implications for the analysis of environmental policy. In fact,
when induced technological change proves pollution-using, the traditional conclusion that
ITC makes environmental policy less expensive/more eective is turned on its head. Fig-
ure 1, illustrates this point. In both panels, the initial equilibrium, point A in the graphs, is
characterized by a pollution price equal to τ0, and by a level of pollution given by P0. The
slope of the MAC curve at the initial equilibrium is given by the expression in (24). Since
we only focus on marginal changes, we can ignore second order eects that might change
the slope of the MAC curve and simplify the diagram by drawing straight lines.
Consider how environmental policy operates when technology is completely exogenous ,
i.e. let the ITC term be zero. In this case, either an exogenous increase in the pollution
charge from τ0 to τ1, say, or a reduction of the number of permits in the cap-and-trade
system from P0 to P1 produce the same outcome, namely a new equilibrium which obtains
at a point like X , along the MAC curve.
Under ITC, however, the outcome depends on the interaction between the nature of tech-
nology, the rm’s incentives to invest, and the type of instrument chosen by the regulator.
The standard case discussed in the literature features pollution-saving technical change. As
discussed above, in this case a more stringent environmental policy induces the crowding
in of green technology, and the MAC curve shifts down to MACS , where the S superscript is
for ‘saving’. The exact new equilibrium level depends on the choice of the instrument. Un-
der exogenous taxation – see Figure 1(a) – as the tax rises to τ1 pollution falls more than in
the exogenous technology case, and the new equilibrium is reached at pointG. Figure 1(b),
instead, presents the equilibrium emerging when the regulator resorts to tradable emission
permits. At the new equilibrium, point G′, the pollution level is the same but the permit
price is lower under ITC, since τG < τ1.
Contrast this outcome, however, to what happens when environmental policy crowds in
investments in brown technology. This has the eect of making pollution more productive
and it raises the opportunity cost of curbing it. The net eect is that the MAC curve shifts
upwards. The equilibrium MAC schedules under ITC – the dashed lines in the graphs
marked MACU , for ‘using’ – are now higher than when technology doesn’t adjust. When
the regulator uses a pollution charge, as in Figure 1(a), less pollution reduction occurs at
the new equilibrium (at point B), relative to the exogenous technology case, indicating a
higher opportunity cost of emissions reductions. When the regulator chooses a cap & trade
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Figure 1: Exogenous policy under induced technological change
system, as in Figure 1(b), the permit price increases more than in the exogenous technology
scenario (to point B′). Since in the symmetric equilibrium τ equals the marginal cost of
pollution reduction, induced pollution-using technical change makes environmental policy
more costly.
The discussion above can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1. Under exogenous policy, induced pollution-using technical change leads to...
i. ...a larger increase in the private marginal cost of environmental policy after a marginal
tightening of the cap on pollution;
ii. ...a smaller pollution reduction following a marginal increase in the pollution charge.
Proof. In the text above. 
This result presents a very dierent picture of the role of ITC from what is commonly dis-
cussed in the literature and sets our paper quite apart from the existing body of technology
as it presents a rather more pessimistic view of the role of technology in solving environ-
mental challenges.26
26In a related contribution, Perino and Requate (2012) nd that an increase in the stringency of environ-
mental policy may result in a reduced rate of technology adoption by rms for a suciently high level of
stringency. Since their focus is on technology adoption and the dynamic eciency of environmental policy,
they compare their outcomes to a benchmark economy without policy – see Footnote 23. It follows that the
introduction of environmental policy can increase aggregate emissions in their framework. In the present
paper, however, our emphasis is on the role of ITC on the cost of policy, and we only focus on marginal
changes in the stringency of existing policy. As a consequence, a scenario such as theirs cannot emerge here,
and environmental policy always reduce pollution emissions.
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4.2 Welfare implications
Proposition 1 presents the implications of ITC for the eectiveness and the cost of exoge-
nous environmental policy. The natural next step is to investigate the consequences of ITC
for the welfare gains due to a tightening of environmental policy. It is easiest in this con-
text to start with a reduction in the emission cap, as in this case the introduction of ITC
does not aect the environmental integrity of the policy change, and comparisons across
regimes are more straightforward.
Consider the utility function in (9), substitute for the level of consumption using the mar-
ket clearing condition (10) and express the resulting expression as a function of P and H
only using the symmetric equilibrium conditions in (8), and (21). Totally dierentiating the
resulting expression and recalling the rst-order conditions (16)-(17), as well as the deni-
tions of the rst-best policy levels (18) and (20), we are able to get the following expression
for the change in welfare in terms of consumption equivalents:
dU
uC
= −

[
(τ ∗ − τ ) − (θ ∗ − θ )k˜P
]
−
[
(σ ∗ − σ ) + (θ ∗ − θ )k˜H
]
ζ r˜P︸                              ︷︷                              ︸
ITC
dP , (27)
where k˜P ≡ yKP−yKNjKK+jKK−yKK > 0 and k˜H is dened in (25).
The expression above illustrates the channels through which a reduction in pollution aects
welfare. Moving from left to right across terms at the right-hand side, we see, rst of all, that
a drop in pollution directly reduces the welfare costs from the environmental externality:
given that the initial price of pollution is suboptimally low, a marginal reduction in pollution
is bound to improve welfare. Next, since physical capital decreases as pollution declines
(recall that k˜P > 0), welfare must improve: the over-supply of physical capital due to the
excessive subsidies – see Assumption 6 – is moderated by the drop in pollution. Finally, the
ITC eect is captured by the second term in the curly bracket. A drop in pollution aects
welfare both via its direct eect onH , captured by r˜P , and its indirect eect onK , gauged by
k˜H r˜P . Changes in pollution aect welfare positively in as far as it increases investment in
technology. If the drop in pollution leads to a reduction in physical capital via the induced
changes in H , however, welfare gains are reduced.
Things are more complicated when we turn to considering environmental policy conducted
via a tax instrument. In this case the channels mentioned above interact with the impact of
ITC on the eectiveness of the tax discussed in Proposition 1. Indeed, in this context any
given increase in the tax has a dierent impact on the equilibrium level of pollution under
ITC than when technology is exogenously given. To see this, simply multiply and divide
the right-hand side of equation (27) by dτ , and use (24) to substitute for dP/dτ to get:
dU
uC
= −

[
(τ ∗ − τ ) − (θ ∗ − θ )k˜P
]
−
[
(σ ∗ − σ ) + (θ ∗ − θ )k˜H
]
ζ r˜P︸                              ︷︷                              ︸
ITC
*,m˜p + m˜Hζ r˜P︸ ︷︷ ︸ITC +-
−1
dτ . (28)
The additional term marked ITC emphasizes precisely the fact that under a pollution charge
ITC inuences welfare also via its impact on the eectiveness of the environmental tax. The
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following proposition summarizes the possible welfare outcomes for each type of instru-
ment:
Proposition 2. Under exogenous policy, induced technical change...
i. ...implies smaller welfare gains from a marginal tightening of the cap on pollution, when-
ever
r˜P < 0 ∩ k˜H > − (σ
∗ − σ )
(θ ∗ − θ ) ,
or,
r˜P > 0 ∩ k˜H < − (σ
∗ − σ )
(θ ∗ − θ ) .
ii. ...implies smaller welfare gains from a marginal increase in the pollution tax, whenever
r˜P < 0 ∩ k˜H > − (σ
∗ − σ )
(θ ∗ − θ ) −
m˜H
m˜P
[
(τ ∗ − τ ) − (θ ∗ − θ ) k˜P
]
(θ ∗ − θ ) ,
or,
r˜P > 0 ∩ k˜H < − (σ
∗ − σ )
(θ ∗ − θ ) −
m˜H
m˜P
[
(τ ∗ − τ ) − (θ ∗ − θ ) k˜P
]
(θ ∗ − θ ) .
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Generally speaking, the statements in the proposition are quite intuitive: under Assumption
6 the crowding in of investment in technology is a positive consequence of environmental
policy, and one would indeed expect that ITC compounds welfare gains when r˜P < 0. These
positive eects may, however, be reversed in the presence of a very strong inducement of
investment in physical capital. Conversely, in the presence of crowding out, ITC would be
expected to reduce welfare by worsening the under-provision of technology in the econ-
omy. In this case, the reduction in physical capital investment due to the complementarity
between technology and physical capital might more than compensate for this negative
impacts, again giving rise to mixed results.
Going beyond this general intuition and in order to grasp the second part of the proposition,
it is necessary to take into account that when policy is implemented via a price instrument,
ITC has the potential to limit the eectiveness of environmental policy when technical
change is pollution-using (see Proposition 1). To see what this implies in terms of welfare
changes, consider the rst claim in part ii. of Proposition 2 above. In this crowding out
scenarion, ITC is pollution-using when technology is brown, i.e. when m˜H > 0 (see Lemma
1). Thus, pollution-using technical chance compounds the negative eects of crowding in
physical capital discussed above. The condition presented in the proposition, reects this
as when m˜H > 0 the threshold for k˜H beyond which ITC represents a drag on welfare
becomes easier to attain. On the contrary, when technological change is pollution-saving –
which, in the case of crowding in requires green technology (i.e., m˜H < 0) – ITC boosts the
environmental benets from any increase in the pollution charge, and ITC tends to increase
welfare, adding to the positive eect of a drop in physical capital. This is evident in the rst
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expression in part ii. above, which shows that, in this case, the requirements for ITC to
contribute negatively to welfare become more stringent (recall that m˜P < 0).27
We conclude this discussion by remarking that our results indicate that ITC may reduce
the welfare benets from environmental policy under either types of technology – green
or brown – and under either choice of policy instrument – quantity-based or price-based.
Once again this suggests that the optimistic conclusions found elsewhere in the literature
are a function of modelling and parametrization choices, rather than of more fundamental
reasons.
5 Endogenous policy under induced innovation
Having discussed the behaviour of rms in the presence of environmental policy, we now
turn to modelling the choice made by the environmental policy authority (the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency – EPA for short) of the ‘best possible’ policy. Realistically, we assume
that the EPA attempts to maximize social welfare but is unable to choose investment policy,
i.e. the investment subsidies are xed. As a consequence, the investment externalities are
not correctly internalized and a second-best situation arises where environmental policy is
used to address both the environmental and investment externalities.
5.1 The regulator’s problem
The EPA’s objective is to maximize the utility of the representative agent, given in (9), sub-
ject to the technological, environmental, and nancial constraints it faces – see equations
(1), (2), and (10) respectively. In addition, the EPA needs to take into account that, once
environmental policy is set, rms will choose their level of investment in both physical
capital and technology according to their rst-order conditions (15) and (16). In short, the
EPA’s maximization program reads:
max
P
U = u (C,N ;ϕ)
s .t . C = y (H ,K , P ,N ) − i (H ,H ) − j (K ,K );
yK = jK − θ ;
yH = iH − σ .
The rst-order necessary condition for this problem is, plainly:
yP = yN + ω (C,N ;ϕ) −
(
yH − iH − iH
) dH
dP −
(
yK − jK − jK
) dK
dP .
Using our by now familiar approach, we express this equation as a function of P and H
only. To do this, we rst note that we can use the goods market equilibrium condition (10),
27A similar discussion holds for the case of crowding out, i.e. when r˜P < 0, keeping in mind, however,
that in this case pollution-using technical change requires green technology.
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together with the production and investment functions, (1), (3), and (5), and the symmetric
equilibrium condition, (8), to rewrite consumption, C , as
C = y (k˜ (H , P ),H , P ,−P ) − i (H ,H ) − j (k˜ (H , P ), k˜ (H , P )) ≡ c˜ (H , P ). (29)
Recalling the expression for ω (C,N ;ϕ) in (11), and using (8) along with (21), the rst-order
condition above becomes
yP (H , P )︸    ︷︷    ︸
m
= yN (H , P ) + ω (˜c,−P ;ϕ)︸                       ︷︷                       ︸
τ ∗
− [yK (H , P ) − jK − jK ]︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
(θ∗−θ )
(
k˜P+k˜H
dH
dP
)
−[yH (H , P ) − iH − iH ]︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
(σ ∗−σ )
dH
dP .
According to this expression, the (second-best) optimal level of pollution allowed by the
EPA is such that the marginal cost of pollution abatement, m, equals the marginal benet
from pollution reduction, i.e. the marginal damage from pollution, at the right-hand side of
the expression above. In the present context the social marginal damage of pollution diers
from the rst-best Pigouvian tax, τ ∗, as it additionally entails a correction that captures
the distortionary eect of the remaining externalities. Correspondingly the second-best
pollution price needed to decentralize the social optimum is, using (26) to substitute the
ratios in the rst-order condition,
τ SB ≡ τ ∗ − (σ ∗ − σ ) ζ r˜P + (θ − θ ∗)
(
k˜P + k˜Hζ r˜P
)
. (30)
Given the existence of the imperfectly corrected externalities linked to capital accumula-
tion the EPA sets the price of pollution taking into account the eect that environmental
policy has on the rms’ investment decisions. When environmental policy crowds in in-
vestment in technology, for example, the EPA optimally tends to set the price of pollution
above the Pigouvian level. In this case the amelioration of the distortion connected to the
sub-optimally low investment in H compounds the environmental benets, and a higher
level of τ is warranted. The EPA, however, also needs to take into account that, in this
context, a higher price for pollution, while alleviating the over-accumulation of physical
capital directly, crowds in K via its complementarity with technology. If a more stringent
environmental policy on balance increases physical capital investment, the regulator is nat-
urally led to re-focus environmental policy towards the correction of the physical capital
externality and opts for a laxer environmental policy. Clearly, the relative strength of the
crowding in/out of physical capital and technology determines the sign and magnitude of
the second-best wedge, (τ SB − τ ∗).28
In Section 4, we have shown that the presence of ITC aects rms’ marginal costs of abate-
ment – i.e. the supply of pollution abatement – beyond the traditional view that it nec-
essarily decreases marginal costs. This is obviously relevant in the present context as it
aects the optimal choice of pollution by the EPA by changing the left-hand side of the
rst-order condition above. The discussion in the previous paragraph suggests that ITC
28Formally, it is easy to show from (30) that in the presence crowding in of H , i.e. when r˜P < 0 the EPA
naturally tends to impose a relatively more stringent environmental policy, unless the indirect crowding in
of physical capital via the complementarity with technology proves too strong. In this case τ SB − τ ∗ > 0
requires k˜H < (σ
∗−σ )
(θ ∗−θ ) − k˜Pζ r˜P . Conversely, when it is the crowding out of technology to prevail and r˜P > 0,
τ SB − τ ∗ > 0 requires k˜H > (σ ∗−σ )(θ ∗−θ ) − k˜Pζ r˜P .
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may also modify the demand for pollution abatement, captured by the right-hand side of
the rst-order condition. It follows that in the context of endogenous policy the role of
ITC is much more pervasive than in the exogenous policy framework. This observation
further underlines the relevance of our analysis in qualifying widespread misconceptions
with respect to the role of ITC in environmental policy. We now turn our attention to the
role of ITC in endogenous policy making.
5.2 A marginal greening of preferences
To investigate the role of ITC in the conduct of environmental policy in this second-best sce-
nario, we let preference become ‘greener’ in the sense that environmental services become
more valuable to consumers, and we analyze the endogenous change in environmental pol-
icy. This thought experiment parallels the exogenous marginal tightening of environmental
policy that we have investigated in previous sections. Our goal is to compare changes in
environmental quality in response to such a shock, with and without ITC. If, following a
‘greening’ of preferences, the level of pollution decreases less under ITC than in its absence,
we can conclude that ITC makes environmental policy more costly to implement.
We start by rewriting the rst-order condition that characterizes the second best using (26)
and re-arranging terms as:
m = τ ∗ + (θ − θ ∗) k˜P −
[(
σ ∗ − σ
)
− (θ − θ ∗) k˜H
]
ζ r˜P . (31)
Formally, our experiment is to shock this expression via an increase in the relative prefer-
ence for environmental quality, parameterized by ϕ. Totally dierentiating (31) and rear-
ranging terms gives us the following expression for how a greening of preferences changes
the optimal level of pollution:29
dP
dϕ =
1(
m˜P − τ˜ ∗P + θ˜ ∗Pk˜P
)
+ ζ
[
m˜H r˜P − τ˜ ∗H r˜P + r˜P
(
θ˜ ∗Pk˜H + θ˜
∗
H k˜P + ζ σ˜
∗
H r˜P + ζ θ˜
∗
Pk˜H r˜P
)︸                                                                 ︷︷                                                                 ︸
ITC
] . (32)
As indicated, the terms multiplied by ζ jointly capture the role of ITC in determining the
optimal level of environmental quality. A positive (respectively, negative) ITC term leads to
a lower (higher) level of pollution relative to the exogenous technology case for any given
change in preference, as stated in our concluding result:
Proposition 3. Following a marginal greening of preferences, induced technical change leads
to a smaller reduction in the second-best optimum level of pollution if and only if
m˜H r˜P − τ˜ ∗H r˜P + r˜P
(
θ˜ ∗Pk˜H + θ˜
∗
H k˜P + ζ σ˜
∗
H r˜P + ζ θ˜
∗
Pk˜H r˜P
)
< 0.
This happens under crowding-in, when:
ωC
[
(σ ∗ − σ ) + (θ ∗ − θ ) k˜H
]
− θ˜ ∗Pk˜H − θ˜ ∗H k˜P
1 + ζ σ˜ ∗H + ζ θ˜
∗
H k˜H
< r˜P < 0,
29In deriving the expression in the text, we abstract from higher-order eects by suppressing all third
order partial derivatives.
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and under crowding-out, when:
0 < r˜P <
ωC
[
(σ ∗ − σ ) + (θ ∗ − θ ) k˜H
]
− θ˜ ∗Pk˜H − θ˜ ∗H k˜P
1 + ζ σ˜ ∗H + ζ θ˜
∗
H k˜H
.
Proof. In Appendix A. 
While the mechanics behind this result are clear, our goal in the remaining of this section
is to focus on the economic intuition. We rst note here that m˜H r˜P in the ITC term in
(32) captures the impact of ITC on the marginal costs of abatement and determines the
pollution-saving, or -using nature of technical change (see Lemma 3). The remainder of
the term gauges the eect of ITC on the social marginal damage of pollution discussed
in Section 5.1. More specically, the term τ˜ ∗H r˜P captures the eect on the Pigouvian tax,
whereas the third and nal term measures the impact of ITC on the second-best wedge.
Given this, it turns out that casting our discussion of the intuition behind Proposition 3
within the framework of the textbook marginal abatement cost/marginal damages graphs
claries the issues and provides useful insights.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of condition (31).30 The MAC curves represent
the marginal cost of abatement and captures the rm’s willingness to pay for pollution, m
in (31). Each MAC curve is drawn for a dierent level of technology. The MD curves show
the marginal damage of pollution, the right-hand side of equation (31) for a given level
of ϕ and H . The second-best level of pollution obtains when, at the margin, the benets
from a further reduction in pollution are just oset by the increase in the costs of pollution
abatement. This level is graphically identied by the intersection of the appropriate MAC
and MD curves. The initial equilibrium is at point A, where the level of technology equals
H0, preferences have not yet shifted so that ϕ = ϕ0, and the level of pollution is PA.
Consider what the exogenous shift in preferences does to the equilibrium, ignoring for the
moment the role of technological change. Asϕ increases toϕ1 indicating a relative greening
of societal preferences, theMD curve shifts upwards since consumers are now more willing
to pay for environmental quality. With given technology, the new equilibrium obtains at
point B. As expected, the level of pollution is lower and environmental quality higher.
Let us now focus on how ITC modies this picture. First of all, following the change in
preferences, and the increased demand for environmental quality, rms adjust their level
of investment in both technology and physical capital. This leads to a change in the (oppor-
tunity) cost of abatement. This aspect was analyzed at length in Section 4, and in particular
in Lemma 3. Figure 2 captures the case where the MAC curve shifts down due to pollution-
saving technical change, for example as a consequence of the crowding in of green technol-
ogy.31 Not surprisingly, if we were to neglect any other impact of ITC, we would conclude
30The gure distinguishes between the model with induced technical change (the heavier solid lines) and
the model in which the level of investment doesn’t adjust following a change in preferences (the lighter lines).
In principle, the two models would generate dierent initial equilibrium levels of pollution. To facilitate the
comparability between the two models and to isolate the eect of ITC, however, we assume an appropriate
calibration of the two models such that they share the same initial equilibrium.
31As discussed in Section 4, a downward shift of the MAC curve might just as well be the result of the
crowding out of brown technology.
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Figure 2: The second-best level of environmental quality when green technology is crowded
in.
that in the presence of ITC a larger reduction in pollution obtains as the new equilibrium
would be at point C . This conclusion, which is in line with the conventional view that
induced technical change lowers the cost of environmental policy, is however incomplete
and, as we will see shortly, potentially misleading. As a matter of fact ITC exerts a com-
plex inuence also on the social marginal damages from pollution and therefore aects the
position of the MD curve.
The social value of pollution damages changes both because of the changes in the optimal
level of the Pigouvian tax, and because of the changes in the second-best distortion. As
refers to the rst aspect we can show the following result:
Lemma 4. Following a marginal reduction in pollution, induced technical change increases
the optimal Pigouvian tax, whenever
τ˜ ∗Hζ r˜P =
{ [
(σ ∗ − σ ) + (θ ∗ − θ ) k˜H
]
ωC + yNH + yNKk˜H
}
ζ r˜P < 0.
This happens under crowding in when
either ωC (θ ∗ − θ ) + yNK > 0, or ωC (θ ∗ − θ ) + yNK < 0 ∩ k˜H < −ωC (σ
∗ − σ ) + yNH
ωC (θ ∗ − θ ) + yNK ;
and under crowding out when
ωC (θ
∗ − θ ) + yNK < 0 ∩ k˜H > −ωC (σ
∗ − σ ) + yNH
ωC (θ ∗ − θ ) + yNK .
Proof. In Appendix A. 
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The expression in the curly brackets provides insights as to why the Pigouvian tax changes
with H . On the one hand, changes in investment aect consumption and modify the con-
sumers’ willingness to pay for environmental quality. On the other hand, since (yNH +
yNKk˜H ) > 0, more H and K make the economy larger, and a larger economy is one worth
protecting more against pollution – there is simply more to lose due to environmental
degradation.
The Lemma tells us that when technology and physical capital are complements, any change
in the economic environment that crowds in investment in technology raises the marginal
damages from pollution and hence boosts the demand for environmental quality provided
that the externality arising from the over-investment in physical capital is not too strong.
At the same time, when investment is crowded out, the demand for environmental quality
tends to fall in response to environmental policy unless a suciently forceful countervailing
reduction in the externality associated with the accumulation of physical capital reverses
this outcome.
The second aspect, i.e. the impact of ITC on the second-best correction in (30), is the subject
of our next result:
Lemma 5. Following a marginal reduction in pollution, induced technical change increases
the stringency of second best taxation whenever, either
r˜P > 0, or r˜P < −
θ˜ ∗Pk˜H + θ˜
∗
H k˜P
ζ
(
σ˜ ∗H + θ˜
∗
H k˜H
) .
Proof. In Appendix A. 
Thus, when environmental policy crowds out technology, investment in both types of capi-
tal are necessarily reduced. It follows that the optimal subsidy level decreases for both types
of investment. For given levels of σ and θ , therefore, the distortion associated with physical
capital becomes more salient than the one associated with H and the EPA concentrates on
correcting it. This leads to an increase in policy stringency or, equivalently for a given τ ∗,
to an increase in the second-best tax gap.
Conversely, when environmental policy crowds in technology, it makes the knowledge
externality more relevant by increasing σ ∗. This justies an increase in τ SB , all else equal.
Investment in physical capital, however, is itself aected by the tightening in environmental
policy. On the one hand, a fall in pollution reduces the accumulation of its complementary
factor, K , which reduces the necessity to use environmental policy to correct the learning-
by-doing distortion. On the other hand, technology and physical capital are themselves
complements and crowding in technology leads to an increased demand for physical capital.
If the inducement of physical capital via ITC proves strong enough, it osets the former
channel and makes more stringent environmental policy attractive. The condition in the
proposition captures precisely this trade-o: only if the joint eect of more H and more K
is strong enough will the second-best tax increase.
These lemmas clearly show that in the multiple distortions world we model in this paper
ITC might well lead to either an increase or a drop in the demand for environmental quality.
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Figure 3: The second-best level of environmental quality when brown technology is
crowded in.
An increase in demand would compound the eects of pollution-saving technical change,
strengthening the optimistic conclusions held by proponents of the conventional view. Un-
der such circumstances, a further upwards shift of theMD schedule in the gure would lead
to an even larger drop in pollution. Perhaps surprisingly, however, even in this pollution-
saving technical change context, things may also go dierently. Indeed, if the crowding in
of physical capital associated with the increased investment in technology is suciently
strong, and/or the initial distortion due to the physical capital subsidies large enough, then
the opportunity cost of large pollution reductions increases, reducing the demand for en-
vironmental quality: this mechanism is captured by a downward shift of the MD curve.
If this reduction in the demand for environmental quality is suciently pronounced, the
nal second-best equilibrium may well feature a higher level of pollution under ITC, than
would have been the case in the absence of adjustments in investment levels. The necessary
condition for such an outcome is given in the text of Proposition 3 and, quite intuitively,
requires a large negative impact from the crowding in of physical capital.
An outcome such as the one we just described, in which ITC proves to be a drag for pollution
reduction is perhaps less surprising in the context of pollution-using technical change. As
shown in Figure 3, while the downward shift of the MD curve is the same as in the previous
case, the pollution-using nature of technical change leads to an increase in the marginal
cost of pollution abatement. As a consequence of both shifts, the decrease in pollution
implied by the greening of preferences is severely curtailed. Notice, moreover, that in the
case just discussed ITC might impact negatively on the amount of pollution abated even
if the demand for environmental quality were to increase. Indeed, a suciently large shift
upwards of the MAC curve could still lead to an equilibrium characterized by a level of
pollution in excess of PB .
To conclude, we need to address the last case covered by Proposition 3, namely the case in
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which the crowding out of technology prevails. From Lemma 3 we know that in this case
we will only ever have pollution-saving technical change, and the MAC curve necessarily
shift down. Proposition 3 shows that in this case ITC limits pollution reductions only in
the case in which the induced crowding out of physical capital is of limited import. Indeed,
while lemma 5 tells us that under crowding out the second-best distortion is always in-
creasing, lemma 4 points out that an increase in the marginal damage is possible, provided
that technology and physical capital are weak substitutes.
6 Discussion and conclusions
Among economists and policy makers an almost universal belief prevails, that ITC makes
environmental policy cheaper and more ambitious abatement targets achievable. In suc-
cessive reports, for example, the Intergovernmental Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) epit-
omizes this crystallized consensus stating that
“long-term stabilization scenarios highlight the importance of technology improve-
ments, advanced technologies, learning-by-doing, and induced technological change,
both for achieving the stabilization targets and cost reduction”, (IPCC, 2007, Chap-
ter 3, page 172)
and that
“the availability of new technologies is crucial for the ability to realistically im-
plement stringent carbon policies” (IPCC, 2014, Chapter 15, page 1178).
As we argued in the introduction, however, this view is at odds with the historical record
showing that technological change may well turn out to be pollution-using. The existing
consensus on the role of ITC simply abstracts from this possibility, and thus concludes
that ITC necessarily reduces the cost of environmental policy. Our discussion in this paper
strives to reconcile the historical record with the theory, and provides several new insights
into the relationship between ITC and (the cost of) environmental policy that have impor-
tant consequences for the design of environmental policy.
Our rst result shows that ITC can increase the cost of environmental policy when techno-
logical change is pollution-using, which implies that the marginal cost of pollution abate-
ment increases following the introduction of new technology (Proposition 1). While the
literature on environmental policy and induced technical change has almost universally
drawn attention to pollution-saving technical change, pollution-using technical change is
far from a special case. Both Baker et al. (2008) and Heal and Tarui (2010) discuss several
cases of technological progress that leads to increases in the marginal costs of abatement,
at least for relatively high abatement levels. Their climate-change related examples include
several intermediate technologies,32 such as increases in the eciency of coal- and gas-red
32Baker et al. (2008) dene ‘intermediate technologies’ somewhat endogenously as “technologies that have
lower emissions than Business-as-Usual technologies, but will be substituted away from in the case of very
high abatement” [ibid.,p.2806].
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electricity generators, carbon capture and sequestration (of less than 100% of emissions),
and cost reduction of ecient gas-red generators. In the transportation sector their list
includes better and less expensive hybrid vehicles as well as bio-diesel. Bauman et al. (2008)
present empirical evidence showing that fuel switching in response to increasing regulation
led to an increase in marginal abatement costs for SO2 in electricity generation in Korea be-
tween 1970 and 1998. Interestingly, all of these technological improvements form part of the
portfolio of technological options usually discussed in connection to ITC. Our results here
contrast sharply with those of other contributions in the literature (e.g. Goulder and Schnei-
der, 1999; Goulder and Mathai, 2000; Sue Wing, 2006; Gerlagh, 2007), quite simply because
such analyses abstract from the possibility of pollution-using technical change: by assum-
ing that technology is always green and that environmental policy necessarily crowds in
new technology, they implicitly end up assuming that ITC is pollution-saving. The key
point we make in this paper is that it is the combination of the characteristics of specic in-
novations, the strength of the production externalities, and the degree of technology-capital
complementarity that endogenously determine whether or not in general equilibrium in-
vestment in a given technology proves green and is stimulated by environmental policy.
Proposition 2 discusses the welfare costs of ITC under exogenous policy, analyzing both
the case where a quantity instrument is used, and the case when a price instrument is
instead favoured. In this part of the paper we emphasize the complex interactions existing
between environmental externalities and investment spillovers. We show, for example,
that the welfare benets from a drop in pollution may be partly oset by the crowding out
underprovided technology. Our analysis transparently reveals the crucial role played by
incompletely internalized external eects, and sheds additional light on dierences across
estimates of the value of ITC in CGE models. For example, Buonanno et al. (2003) neglect
the role of market failures in R&D, and obtain larger estimates for the impact of ITC on the
cost of environmental policy than Popp (2004), who explicitly recognizes the divergence
between the social and the private returns to innovation.
Our third result focuses on the importance of general equilibrium eects in this debate.
Proposition 3 emphasizes that ITC also aects the consumers’ marginal willingness to pay
for environmental quality improvements. As the willingness to pay changes, so does the
relative costliness of environmental policy and the equilibrium level of environmental qual-
ity. We show that shifts in both the MAC curve and the marginal damage curve are crucial
to the nal outcome, and that a negative role for ITC may emerge even when technologi-
cal change is pollution-saving from the point of view of the representative rm. One key
dierence exists between our analysis and the existing literature. In our general equilib-
rium model, changes in investment aect income and consumption and hence, through
shifting the demand for environmental quality, aect marginal damages. Most of the ex-
isting literature, however, frames this question in a partial equilibrium context, typically
assuming that the marginal benets from pollution reduction equal (the present value of
avoided) marginal pollution damages, that only depend on environmental magnitudes (pol-
lution stock, environmental quality, etc.). In the context of our model, this would imply that
marginal damages depend on N , but not H . By construction, then, ITC does not aect en-
vironmental policy via changes in marginal damages, and the general equilibrium eects
we nd here are neglected. Both Goulder and Mathai (2000) and Heal and Tarui (2010), for
example, posit a social loss function that is additively separable in abatement costs and dam-
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ages, where the latter only depend on cumulative emissions. The sharp contrast between
the unambiguously positive eect of ITC in partial equilibrium models, and our much more
nuanced conclusions highlights the importance of considering general equilibrium eects
when gauging the relevance of ITC for environmental policy.
Overall our analysis paints a profoundly dierent picture of the link between ITC and the
cost of environmental policy from the one commonly found in the literature. Indeed a far
less attering role may emerge for ITC when technology is complementary with physical
capital that needs polluting inputs or when additional uncorrected distortions are present
in the economy. Arguably, these situations are far from uncommon, and represent a more
realistic description of actual economies than stylized rst-best models.
The policy implications of our analysis are signicant, especially since our results are ob-
tained in an empirically plausible framework. In a second-best context with multiple exter-
nalities, induced innovation, far from being the deus ex-machina that enables the achieve-
ment of ambitious environmental targets, was shown to have the potential to increase the
cost of environmental regulation. Our discussion in this paper suggests that, as long as
traditional polluting sectors are subsidized and the economy remains locked into pollution-
intensive technologies, the incremental (green) innovation induced by environmental poli-
cies is likely to become counterproductive and to only increase demand for pollution in
these sectors.
Our research indicates that a comprehensive approach to environmental problems – i.e.
one which takes into account the productive impact of increases in environmental quality,
the need to correct technology spillovers, and the type of technologies that are likely to
emerge from the purposive activity of innovators – is needed to take full advantage of the
potential benets of ITC, avoid the possible costs it entails, and ensure that environmental
policy achieves the desired shade of green.
References
Acemoglu, D., P. Aghion, L. Bursztyn, and D. Hemous (2012): “The Environment and
Directed Technical Change,” American Economic Review, 102, 131–166.
Amir, R., M. Germain, and V. Van Steenberghe (2008): “On the Impact of Innovation on
the Marginal Abatement Cost Curve,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, 10, 985–1010.
Antweiler, W., B. R. Copeland, and M. S. Taylor (2001): “Is Free Trade Good for the
Environment?” American Economic Review, 91, 877–908.
Arrow, K. (1962): “The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing,” Review of Economic
Studies, 29, 155–173.
Baker, E., L. Clarke, and E. Shittu (2008): “Technical Change and the Marginal Cost of
Abatement,” Energy Economics, 30, 2799–2816.
Bauman, Y., M. Lee, and K. Seeley (2008): “Does Technological Innovation Really Reduce
Marginal Abatement Costs? Some Theory, Algebraic Evidence, and Policy Implications,”
Environmental and Resource Economics, 40, 507–527.
Shades of Green - Environmental Policy and ITC 28
Brechet, T. and G. Meunier (2014): “Are Clean Technology and Environmental Quality
Conicting Policy Goals?” Resource and Energy Economics, 38, 61–83.
Buonanno, P., C. Carraro, and M. Galeotti (2003): “Endogenous induced technical
change and the costs of Kyoto,” Resource and Energy Economics, 25, 11–34.
Coady, D., I. Parry, L. Sears, and B. Shang (2015): “How Large Are Global Energy Subsi-
dies?” IMF Working Paper WP/15/105.
Cole, M. A. and R. J. R. Elliott (2003): “Determining the trade-environment composition
eect: the role of capital, labor and environmental regulations,” Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 46, 363–383.
Davis, L. W. (2014): “The Economic Cost of Global Fuel Subsidies,” American Economic
Review, 104, 581–85.
Edenhofer, O., K. Lessmann, C. Kemfert, M. Grubb, and J. Köhler (2006): “Induced
technological change: Exploring its implications for the economics of atmospheric stabi-
lization; Synthesis report from the innovation modelling comparison project,” The Energy
Journal, Special Issue no.1, 57–108.
Gans, J. (2012): “Innovation and Climate Change Policy,” American Economic Journal: Eco-
nomic Policy, 4, 125–145.
Gerlagh, R. (2007): “Measuring the Value of Induced Technological Change,” Energy Policy,
35, 5287–5297.
Goulder, L. H. (2004): “Induced Technological Change and Climate Policy,” Tech. rep., Pew
Center on Global Climate Change.
Goulder, L. H. and K. Mathai (2000): “OptimalCO2 Abatement in the Presence of Induced
Technological Change,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 39, 1–38.
Goulder, L. H. and S. Schneider (1999): “Induced Technological Change and the attrac-
tiveness of CO2 Abatement Policies,” Resource and Energy Economics, 21, 211–253.
Griliches, Z. (1992): “The search for R&D spillovers,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics,
94, S29–47.
Heal, G. and N. Tarui (2010): “Investment and emission control under technology and
pollution externalities,” Resource and Energy Economics, 32, 1–14.
Intriligator, M. D. (1965): “Embodied technical change and productivity in the United
States, 1929-1958,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 47, 65–70.
IPCC (2007): Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Metz, B.,
O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave and L.A. Meyer (eds.), Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Shades of Green - Environmental Policy and ITC 29
——— (2014): Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working
Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
O. Edenhofer, R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I.
Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow,
T. Zwickel, and J.C. Minx (eds.), Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Jaffe, A. B., R. G. Newell, and R. N. Stavins (2003): “Technological Change and the En-
vironment,” in Handbook of Environmental Economics, ed. by K. Mäler and J. R. Vincent,
Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, vol. 1, 461–516.
Jones, C. I. (1995): “R&D-Based Models of Economic Growth,” Journal of Political Economy,
103, pp. 759–784.
Milliman, S. R. and R. Prince (1989): “Firms Incentives to Promote Technological Change
in Pollution Control,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 17, 247–265.
Nordhaus, W. D. (2002): “Modeling induced innovation in climate-change policy,” in Tech-
nological Change and the Environment, ed. by A. Grubler, N. Nakicenovic, and W. D. Nord-
haus, Wahsington, DC: Resources for the Future Press, 182–209.
Parry, I., W. A. Pizer, and C. Fischer (2003): “How Large are the Welfare Gains from
Technological Innovation Induced by Environmental Policies?” Journal of Regulatory
Economics, 23, 237–255.
Perino, G. and T. Reqate (2012): “Does more stringent environmental regulation induce
or reduce technology adoption?: When the rate of technology adoption is inverted U-
shaped,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 64, 456–467.
Popp, D. (2004): “ENTICE: Endogenous Technical Change in the DICE Model of Global
Warming,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 48, 742–768.
Reqate, T. and W. Unold (2003): “Environmental Policy Incentives to Adopt Advanced
Abatement Technology: Will the True Ranking Please Stand Up?” European Economic
Review, 47, 125–146.
Romer, P. M. (1986): “Increasing Returns and Long Run Growth,” Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 94, 1002–37.
Solow, R. (1960): “Investment and technical progress,” in The Theory and Empirical Analysis
of Production, ed. by M. Brown, Dordrecht: Columbia University Press, 25–50.
Stern, N. (2006): “Stern Review on The Economics of Climate Change,” Tech. rep., HM
Treasury, London.
Sue Wing, I. (2006): “Induced Technological Change: Firm Innovatory Responses to Envi-
ronmental Regulation,” mimeo, Boston University.
Shades of Green - Environmental Policy and ITC 30
A Proofs of results omitted in the main text
Proposition 2
Ad i. That ITC reduces the welfare gains from a marginal tightening of the emissions cap
requires dUdτ
˜rP=0 > dUdτ ˜rP,0. From (27), this implies[
(σ ∗ − σ ) + (θ ∗ − θ )k˜H
]
ζ r˜P > 0.
The statement in the proposition follows immediately taking into account that ζ > 0.
Ad ii. From equation (28), we have in this case that:
dU
dτ
˜rP=0 > dUdτ ˜rP,0 ⇔
⇔ (τ
∗ − τ ) − (θ ∗ − θ )k˜P
m˜P
<
[
(τ ∗ − τ ) − (θ ∗ − θ )k˜P
]
−
[
(σ ∗ − σ ) + (θ ∗ − θ )k˜H
]
ζ r˜P
m˜P + m˜Hζ r˜P
.
Recalling that m˜P + m˜H r˜P < 0, we can rewrite the last expression as:
1 + m˜H
m˜P
r˜P > 1 − (σ
∗ − σ ) + (θ ∗ − θ )k˜H
(τ ∗ − τ ) − (θ ∗ − θ )k˜P
r˜P .
Simple manipulations, and the fact that m˜P < 0, lead to the inequalities in the statement of
the Proposition. 
Proposition 3
From (32), it is clear that, since
(
m˜P − τ˜ ∗P + θ˜ ∗Pk˜P
)
< 0, the change in pollution driven by
a greening of preferences is smaller under ITC whenever the term identied by the brace
is negative. First, notice that from (25) and (30), and the fact that (21) implies that k˜H =
yHK
jKK−yKK , it is possible to write:(
m˜H − τ˜ ∗H
)
= r˜P − ωC
[
(σ ∗ − σ ) + (θ ∗ − θ ) k˜H
]
.
It follows that the ITC term in (32) can be expressed as:
r˜P
{(
1 + ζ σ˜ ∗H + ζ θ˜
∗
H k˜H
)
− ωC
[
(σ ∗ − σ ) + (θ ∗ − θ ) k˜H
]
+ θ˜ ∗Pk˜H + θ˜
∗
H k˜P
}
.
Solving for the ITC term to be negative, recalling Assumptions 4 and 6, immediately gives
the restrictions in the statement above. 
Lemma 4
ITC increases the demand for environmental quality whenever the change in H induced by
the reduction in pollution causes τ ∗ to increase. Formally, this requires: τ˜ ∗H (dH/dP )dP > 0,
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∀dP < 0, or equivalently: τ˜ ∗H (dH/dP ) < 0. Recall that τ ∗ can be written as
τ˜ ∗(H , P ) ≡ yN (H , k˜, P ,−P ) + ω (˜c,−P ;ϕ).
Upon partial dierentiation with respect to H , we nd:
τ˜ ∗H = yNH + yNKk˜H + ωCc˜H . (A.1)
From (29), using (15), (16) and the denitions in (19) and (20), we get:
c˜H = yH − iH − iH + (yK − jK − jK )k˜H = (σ ∗ − σ ) + (θ ∗ − θ )k˜H .
Using this expression and the denition of dH/dP from (26) in (A.1), we immediately get:
τ˜ ∗Hζ r˜P =
{ [
(σ ∗ − σ ) + (θ ∗ − θ ) k˜H
]
ωC + yNH + yNKk˜H
}
ζ r˜P < 0.
Given the positiveness of ζ , it is a simple matter of algebra to solve for the inequalities in
the text of the Lemma. 
Lemma 5
First of all, notice that for given τ ∗ the statement in the Lemma is equivalent to requiring
that
d
(
τ SB − τ ∗
)
dP < 0.
Totally dierentiating (30) abstracting from higher-order eects by suppressing all third-
order partial derivatives,33 yields:
d
(
τ SB − τ ∗
)
= −
[
θ˜ ∗Pk˜P + θ˜
∗
Pk˜Hζ r˜P
]
dP −
[
θ˜ ∗H k˜P + σ˜
∗
Hζ r˜P + θ˜
∗
H k˜Hζ r˜P
]
dH .
Since dH = dHdP dP , using (26), we immediately get:
d
(
τ SB − τ ∗
)
dP = −θ˜
∗
Pk˜P −
[
θ˜ ∗Pk˜H + θ˜
∗
H k˜P + σ˜
∗
Hζ r˜P + θ˜
∗
H k˜Hζ r˜P
]
ζ r˜P︸                                             ︷︷                                             ︸
ITC
.
It follows that for ITC to increase the dierence (τ SB−τ ∗) as P is reduced, the term indicated
with ITC in the expression above must be positive. Using (18) and (19), together with (8)
and (21) to express σ ∗ and θ ∗ as functions of H and P only, it immediately follows that
σ˜ ∗H = −(iHH + iHH ), θ˜ ∗P = −(jKK + jKK )k˜P , and θ˜ ∗H = −(jKK + jKK )k˜H . From the denition of
k˜P and k˜H , and Assumptions 2 and 4, it is clear that all these derivatives are positive, and that
the ITC term is necessarily positive as long as r˜P is also positive. When r˜P < 0, instead, it is
a simple matter of algebraic manipulations to show that the ITC term is positive whenever,
r˜P < −
θ˜ ∗Pk˜H + θ˜
∗
H k˜P
ζ
(
σ˜ ∗H + θ˜
∗
H k˜H
) .

33Notice that this implies from (26), (25) and the denition of k˜P in (27), that we treat r˜P , k˜H and k˜P as
constants.
